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Abstract: We estimate the elasticity of corporate taxable income with respect to the effective 
corporate tax rate on the basis of a pseudo-panel constructed from corporate tax return micro 
data for the period 1998-2001, a period which saw the introduction of a major corporate tax 
reform in Germany. Endogeneity of the effective tax rate is controlled for by an instrumental 
variable approach.  Our instrument for the observed effective corporate tax rate  is  the 
counterfactual effective tax rate a corporation would face in a particular period had there be 
no endogenous change of corporate profits. This counterfactual is obtained from a detailed 
microsimulation model of the corporate sector based on tax return micro data. We find a 
statistically significant and relatively  large point estimate of the average tax base elasticity, 
which implies that a reduction of the statutory corporate tax rate would reduce corporate tax 
receipts less than proportionally due to income shifting activities.  We also find some 
statistically weak evidence for the hypothesis that the tax base elasticity is  higher for 
corporations that may benefit from various forms of tax shields. 
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1  Introduction 
Reforming the corporate income tax  (CIT)  has been an important topic both in public 
finance and  in the  economic  policy  debate  (see, e.g.,  Devereux and Sørensen 2006, 
OECD 2007).  Most critics of the CIT  stress  its perceived  negative  effects on economic 
efficiency and question its usefulness for raising tax revenues. Although the CIT raises little 
revenue in most OECD countries, supporters of the CIT are concerned that international tax 
competition will lead to a “race to the bottom” in the taxation of internationally mobile 
corporate capital. In fact, statutory corporate tax rates have been reduced in most OECD 
countries over the last several decades, and this development seems to have accelerated in 
recent years (see, e.g., OECD 2007). For example, in Germany the statutory corporate tax rate 
was reduced from 45 % in 1998 to 25 % in 2001. As in several other countries which reduced 
statutory corporate tax rates in recent decades, this has, however, not  resulted in a 
proportional decline in corporate tax revenues. This indicates that part of tax rate reductions 
may be “self-financing” induced by higher economic activity or reduced income shifting and 
tax avoidance strategies of the corporate sector.  
Empirical estimates of the elasticity of the corporate tax base to changes in the corporate 
tax rate provide important information for assessing both the revenue and welfare 
implications of corporate tax policy. Recent empirical studies based on aggregate OECD data 
(Clausing 2007, Brill and Hassett 2007, Devereux 2007) find that countries with statutory tax 
rates exceeding 30 % may have been on the declining segment of the CIT “Laffer curve”, 
implying that tax rate reductions may even have increased corporate tax revenues in these 
countries. In contrast to these aggregate studies, using accounting-based industry-level panel 
data for publicly-traded companies in the US, Gruber and Rauh (2007) report an elasticity of 
taxable corporate income to the “effective” marginal corporate tax rate of -0.2. This elasticity 
is considerably smaller than the “benchmark” estimate of the elasticity of taxable personal 
income with respect to the marginal personal tax rate of -0.4 obtained by Gruber and Saez 
(2002) for the US.  
This relatively small elasticity implies that, at least for the US, reductions of the CIT rate 
would only be partly “self-financing” and would substantially reduce corporate tax revenues. 
As stressed by Gruber and Rauh, this relatively small elasticity may also imply that the CIT is 
much less inefficient than is often assumed in the literature on corporate income taxation. 
However, it is not clear to what extent these results also hold for other countries and corporate 
tax regimes.  Furthermore, estimated tax base elasticities may be sensitive to  different 
definitions of the corporate tax base and “effective” tax rates as well as the way the potential     2 
reverse causation (“endogeneity”) between the tax base and the tax rate is modelled. In other 
words, there is currently no “benchmark” estimate of the corporate tax base elasticity. 
In this paper, we estimate the elasticity of the  corporate tax base with respect to the 
effective corporate tax rate (ETR) for the German economy using a comprehensive tax return 
data set.  The main methodological problem is that, for various reasons, the  ETR may be 
endogenous as it is partly determined by taxable income.  To control for endogeneity of 
changes in  the  ETR  we  follow Gruber and Saez (2002) and  Gruber and Rauh (2007) and 
estimate the tax base elasticity by an instrumental variable approach. As an instrument for the 
observed ETR we use the counterfactual ETR a corporation would face in a particular period 
had there be no endogenous change of corporate profits. This counterfactual is obtained from 
a detailed microsimulation model of the corporate sector based on tax return micro data for 
1998 and 2001. This period saw the introduction of a substantial tax reform which provides 
sufficient exogenous variation in the ETR across corporations to identify the corporate taxable 
income elasticity.  
Apart from its broad coverage, an important advantage of the tax return data used in this 
study is that they allow us to calculate ETR and the corporate income tax base taking into 
account various tax shields. In particular, these include used loss carry-forward which has 
become of major quantitative importance for the corporate sector also in the German economy 
(for similar developments in the US, see Cooper and Knittel 2006 and Auerbach 2007). The 
huge difference in the amount of used loss carry-forward across corporations also provides 
the exogenous variation in the ETR for our identification strategy of the tax base elasticity. 
For the estimation we use a pseudo-panel constructed by aggregation of the individual-level 
corporate tax return data into about 1,000 groups defined by industry (up to the 5-digit level) 
and by region. This pseudo panel allows us to control for observed and unobserved factors 
which may be correlated with both the corporate tax base and the ETR.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. As a basis for the specification of our 
empirical model, in the next section we provide some background on the measurement of 
effective profit taxation and the corporate tax base and review the related empirical literature. 
Section 3 describes the data and details the identification and estimation of the tax base 
elasticity.  Our preferred specification of the regression model, summarized in Section 4, 
yields a statistically significant and relatively  large point estimate of the average tax base 
elasticity. This estimate implies that a reduction of the (proportional) statutory corporate tax 
rate would reduce corporate tax receipts  less than proportionally due to income shifting 
activities. It also implies that, even at the substantially reduced statutory tax rates brought 
about by the recent tax reforms in Germany, substantial distortions of the CIT  remain. We     3 
also find some statistically weak evidence for the hypothesis that the tax base is  more 
responsive for corporations that may benefit from various forms of tax shields. Section 5 
summarizes our main results and concludes.  
 
2  Effective Tax Rates, the Corporate Tax Base, and Behavioral Response 
The public finance literature on corporate taxation distinguishes between “forward-
looking” and “backward-looking” measures of “effective” corporate tax rates (for summaries 
see, e.g., Fullerton 1984, Devereux 2004, Gordon et al. 2004). Both measures in general differ 
from the statutory corporate tax rate, i.e. the nominal tax rate levied on taxable income at the 
corporate level. In most countries, including Germany on which we focus here, this statutory 
rate does not depend on the level of corporate profits, and the corporate tax assessed is 
proportional to taxable corporate income.
1 Only under very special circumstances would the 
statutory tax rates measure the incentive or revenue effects of the CIT. 
Forward-looking ETR are intended to measure the incentive effects of the CIT and are 
usually derived on the basis of the King and Fullerton (1984)  methodology. The marginal 
ETR measures the proportion on a marginal investment that is paid in tax. It is the difference 
between the before-tax and the after-tax rate of return, measured relative to the before-tax 
return. The ETR deviates from the statutory tax rate if “true” corporate income deviates from 
taxable income. Strictly speaking, this measure is only applicable to investments with zero 
excess profits, but can be extended to investments with positive profits  as well  (see 
Devereux 2004).  Although this approach can also be extended to account for certain 
complexities of the tax code, such as special tax expenditures and deductions, this is usually 
very demanding in terms of data requirements. Thus, forward-looking ETR are usually 
calculated only for a few hypothetical cases of investment projects (see, e.g., Devereux et 
al. 2003).  
Backward-looking measures of the  ETR, in contrast, are based on information of the 
corporate tax actually assessed and some measure of corporate profits. They thus account for 
previous corporate investment and financing decisions, as well as  for previous and future 
losses which may be offset against current profits by way of used loss carry-forward and loss 
carry-backward. A disadvantage of this measure of the ETR is that it might be of limited use 
for evaluating the incentives of the current tax system or of some proposed tax reform on 
                                                 
1  The US, the UK and Japan tax corporate income in higher income brackets at a higher rate, some European 
countries (e.g., Belgium and the Netherlands) provide a basic allowance for corporate income. Overall, there 
seems to be a tendency to reduce the “progressivity” of the CIT (see, e.g., OECD 2007, Weichenrieder 2007).      4 
corporate investment decisions as far as current regulations concerning various tax shields are 
not expected to hold in the future as well.  
Fullerton (1984) provides a long list of reasons why these measures of ETR may deviate 
from each other, and what the implications of these differences might be for tax revenues and 
economic efficiency.  Which ETR is the most appropriate one obviously depends on the 
purpose to which it is applied. Fullerton (1984: 12) argues that average ETR are appropriate 
for measuring cash flows, while marginal ETR are designed to capture incentives to use new 
capital. Gordon et al. (2004) provide arguments why backward looking measures may be 
more useful in terms of explaining the relationship between tax rates and tax receipts in the 
corporate sector.  
Since this is exactly the focus of our study we will use a backward-looking measure of the 
average ETR derived from corporate tax return data. Our measure of the ETR is the ratio of 
the corporate tax assessed in a given year to Adjusted Gross Income (AGI). AGI differs from 
Taxable Income (TI) mainly by the amount of a corporation’s tax loss carry-back and carry-
forward set off against current profits (see the stylized calculation of these measures in 
Appendix A2). For a given level of current profits, corporations with unused tax-loss carry-
forward or carry-backward may face very different ETR compared to those corporations that 
do not dispose of  a stock of previous accrued losses. As we show below,  it is of great 
importance to account especially  for the use of loss carry-forward in the calculation of the 
corporate tax base.
2  The variation in the amount of used loss carry-forward across 
corporations also provides the exogenous variation in the ETR for our identification strategy 
of the tax base elasticity as described in Section 3.2.  
Our empirical analysis will focus on the elasticity of the corporate tax base, as measured 
by AGI, with respect to the ETR, i.e.  ( ) ( ) // AGIETRETRAGI b ”DD· . This elasticity is 
related to the relative change of the amount of  corporate tax assessed (TA) to a relative 
change of the statutory tax rate (t) by the formula 
(1)   ( )( ) ,, //1 TIAGIETR TATA t ttbhh D=D+··,  
where  ( ) ( ) , // TIAGI TIAGIAGITI h ”DD·  and  ( ) ( ) , // ETRt ETRETR htt ”DD· . 
If deductions and allowances D were proportional to AGI with factor of proportionality d, 
and in the absence of loss carry-forward and loss carry-back, TI = (1-d)·AGI, ETR = (1-d)·t 
                                                 
2  Bach and Dwenger (2007) show that the volume of yet unused losses from the past in the G erman corporate 
sector has increased from Euro 128.3 billion in 1992 to E uro 380.2 billion in 2001, which amounts to about 
330% of corporate profits in 2001. Similar results for the US are reported by Cooper and Knittel (2006) who 
also report that large stocks of net operating losses have been generated in the US in recent years and that these 
tax losses are highly concentrated over a relatively small number of companies.     5 
and  ,, 1. TIAGIETRt hh ==   Thus, a given percentage change in the statutory tax rate  would 
translate into a proportional change of TA with the factor of proportionality given by b, which 
needs to be estimated econometrically. In case deductions are not proportional to AGI, or in 
the presence of loss carry-forward and loss carry-back, estimates of  the elasticities 
( ) ( ) , 1// h =-DD· TIAGI DAGIAGITI   and  ,, 1, ETRD tt hh =+ with  ( ) ( ) , //, D DD t htt ”DD· are 
also required; these elasticities can be obtained by microsimulation (see Section 4.2).  
The size of the tax base elasticity determines to what extent the direct change of tax 
receipts resulting from a change in the statutory tax rate is compensated for by real adjustment 
or income shifting activities of the corporate sector. Generally, b is expected to be negative 
but may vary between zero and -1. If corporations did not respond to tax rate changes, b = 0, 
a given percentage change of the statutory tax rate would reduce the corporate tax revenue by 
the same percentage. On the other hand, if b = -1, and assuming for simplicity that deductions 
are proportional to AGI, a reduction of the statutory tax rate would not change corporate tax 
revenue at all. For -1< b < 0, a reduction of the statutory tax rate by a percent would reduce 
corporate tax revenue by a(1+b) %. In case b < -1, reduction of the statutory tax rate would 
increase tax revenue, which would correspond to  the downward-sloping  segment of the 
“Laffer curve” (see, e.g., Clausing 2007, Devereux 2007, Brill and Hassett 2007  for recent 
applications to corporate taxation).  
The corporate tax base may react less than proportionally to a change in the statutory tax 
rate (-1< b < 0) due to corporations’ real responses and to various forms of income shifting. 
Real responses may result by corporations increasing the volume of sales or real investment. 
Taxable income may deviate from  “true” corporate profits due to various forms of income 
shifting (see e.g. Creedy and Gemmell 2007). First, profits may be shifted from the corporate 
to the personal sector depending on the difference of the tax rates by which the two are taxed 
nationally (see, e.g., Gordon and Slemrod 2000, Fuest and Weichenrieder 2002). International 
income shifting may occur based on either corporate  financing strategies or by means of 
transfer pricing (for summaries see, e.g., Hines 1999, Newlon 2000).  
Previous literature found surprisingly high elasticities of reported corporate income with 
respect to changes in “tax haven’s” tax rates.  For Canadian provinces, Mintz and 
Smart (2004) report high elasticities of taxable income with respect to tax rates based on 
administrative tax data. For a number of OECD countries, Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) 
find that about two thirds of the revenues which could be expected to be raised in the absence 
of income shifting activities from a unilateral increase in the statutory tax rate is lost because 
of a decline in reported income.  Also using aggregate OECD data,  Riedl and Rocha-    6 
Akis (2007) find that the corporate income tax base is negatively affected by a country’s own 
tax rate and positively by the tax rates of its neighbor countries. For a sample of European 
multinationals, Huizinga and Laeven (2008) find an average elasticity of the reported tax base 
with respect to the statutory tax rate of .45.  They also report below-average tax base 
elasticities for the larger European economies: The lowest elasticity estimate is obtained for 
Germany, which is explained by outward profit shifting induced by tax rate differentials and 
the high German statutory corporate tax rate in the observation period. Using data on German 
multinationals, Weichenrieder (2008) also finds some evidence for profit shifting behavior 
regarding the correlation between the home country tax rate of a parent and the net of tax 
profitability  of its German affiliate as well as some indirect evidence for outbound profit 
shifting behavior. Using the same data base, Buettner et al. (2006) find some evidence that the 
impact of local taxes on corporations’ investment decisions  may be affected by legal 
restrictions on interest deductions on inter-company debt.  
 
3  Data and Empirical Methodology  
Our goal is to measure the impact of the effective tax rate faced by a given company on 
the level of its tax base, i.e. we want to estimate the elasticity of the corporate tax base with 
respect to the effective tax rate. For the reasons given in the previous section, we measure the 
corporate tax base by AGI and the ETR by the ratio of the corporate income tax assessed to 
the corporation’s AGI in a given year. The main methodological problem is that, for various 
reasons, this elasticity is unlikely to be identified by a simple regression of log(AGI) on 
log(ETR). The ETR (unlike the proportional statutory tax rate) varies across corporations due 
to differences in deductible allowances and expenses which also determine the corporate tax 
base. Most importantly, as shown below, the ETR is strongly affected by the amount of loss 
carry-forward in a given year which, in turn, depends on a corporation’s profit position in that 
year. In case the amount of profit is small relative to the volume of the corporation’s tax 
carry-forward, its  ETR  will be relatively low, inducing a negative spurious correlation 
between these two variables. Furthermore, certain deductible allowances and expenses, which 
affect the corporation’s assessed tax, may also be correlated with its profits, thereby also 
inducing spurious correlation between the corporation’s tax base and ETR. In addition, there 
may be other observed and unobserved factors which may be correlated with both the AGI 
and the ETR and which need to be controlled for in the estimation of the tax base elasticity. 
Whilst it seems impossible to control for these factors on the basis of a single cross 
section, we argue that the tax base elasticity can be identified by taking advantage of the 
pseudo-panel structure of our corporate tax return data and changes to the corporate tax     7 
system introduced by the Tax Relief Act in the period 1998-2001. Our data come f rom 
corporate tax returns for the years 1998 and 2001. Since these data are only available for two 
cross sections, we construct a pseudo-panel for the estimation, as described in Section 3.1.1. 
We control for potential endogeneity bias by, first, accounting for fixed effects and, second, 
by instrumenting the ETR following the methodology proposed by Gruber and Saez (2002) 
and Gruber and Rauh (2007).  As described in Section 3.1.2, our  instrument for ETR is 
constructed by exploiting changes in the tax law in the period spanned by our pseudo-panel 
data and making use of a detailed microsimulation model based on the individual corporate 
tax return data.  
 
3.1 Data 
3.1.1  Construction of a pseudo-panel from corporate tax return data  
The German corporate tax return data we use in this study are provided by the German 
Federal Statistical Office every three years (Gräb 2006).
3 The latest year currently available is 
2001. We restrict our analysis to the period 1998-2001. Although tax return data are also 
available for 1995, there was no tax reform between this year and 1998 affecting corporate 
taxation which we could use for our analysis. The year 1992, the only other year for which 
micro data on corporate tax returns is available, could not be included in our analysis because 
classification of industries was changed between 1992 and 1998, and it turned out impossible 
to classify industries in the data set for 1992 comparably to those used in 1998 and 2001, 
which is a requisite for the construction of the pseudo panel data. 
The micro data on corporate tax returns represent all corporations subject to the German 
corporate income tax, which means nearly 740,000 firms in 1998 and about 810,000 in 2001. 
The data are constructed from all tax returns filed in a given year and provide information on 
more than 100 items that are relevant for calculating the corporate income tax. Information on 
taxable income and on the corporate income tax  assessed is also part of the dataset. 
Furthermore, it records information on  firms’ characteristics such as  industry, region, and 
legal form.  
Tax return data have several distinct advantages compared to accounting data. First, they 
provide a broad coverage of the corporate sector. Second, they record the corporate income 
                                                 
3  Individual data have been made anonymous. Researchers have access to the data through the research centres 
of the Statistical Offices (www.forschungsdatenzentren.de). Some information in English on these data is avai-
lable under:  
http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/EN/Navigation/Statistics/FinanzenSteuern/St
euern/Koerperschaftsteuer/Koerperschaftsteuer.psml     8 
tax actually assessed, together with taxable corporate profits. Third, they also contain certain 
components important for the calculation of the effective tax rate like the actual and potential 
amount of loss carry-forward. On the other hand, there are also some disadvantages of these 
data. In particular, we can only use the 1998 and 2001 cross-sections for our purpose and 
these data are currently not available as a panel. We, therefore, had to construct a pseudo-
panel data set based on these two cross-sections.  
For that purpose,  we have grouped corporations according to their industries and the 
regional affiliation of their headquarters, where the lowest level of region is defined at the 
level of the 16 German federal states (Bundeslaender). We chose these criteria because both a 
corporation’s industry and headquarter are supposed to remain unchanged over a short time 
horizon, i.e. their location decision is not likely to be influenced by the tax reform we analyze 
here. Grouping by industry is also natural because some of the variation in taxation rules takes 
place at the industry level.  
We aggregated the micro data into groups by applying the following sequential procedure 
(see Appendix A1): First, we assessed the number of corporations within each industry at the 
two-digit level in the 2001 cross section data. For groups with a large number of corporations 
at this level we checked the number of corporations at the three-digit level. If there were more 
than 50 corporations at this level, we checked whether the industry could be disaggregated to 
the three-digit level given the requirement that there are at least 50 corporations within the 
resulting group.
4 If this was not the case, we kept the group at the two-digit level. In this vein, 
we proceeded to the five-digit level. As it turned out, some groups are quite large even at the 
five-digit level, including several thousands of corporations. In that case we used regional 
affiliation as subordinate classification criterion and further differentiated the groups between 
Eastern and Western Germany, and if  possible between federal states as well.  By this 
procedure each corporation was attributed to one of 1,137 groups. The same classification of 
groups was applied to the 1998 cross section.
5 
 
                                                 
4  As a robustness check we also constructed a pseudo panel with a minimum group size of 40 and 45, 
respectively. We find that, while the number of groups slightly increases with a lower minimum group size 
(plus 28 and 2 groups, respectively), our results remain unchanged. 
5  We thereby took into account that the classification of industries was partly changed between 1998 and 2001 
by matching the old industry identifier to the new one. Since this was not always possible, we rearranged a few 
groups in a way to make the data sets for the two years comparable. We exclude those observations for which 
the industry is unknown or obviously erroneous. Revealing the industry is compulsory but leaves taxes for a 
given corporation unchanged; it is unlikely that there is any systematic concealment of the industry and 
therefore discarding those observations should not bias our results. We also drop all private households in the 
dataset because they were only partly included in the 1998 dataset and are not the focus of the present study.     9 
3.1.2  Corporate tax base and effective tax rate 
Starting from a corporation’s profit as shown in its tax balance sheet, our measure of the 
corporate tax base, AGI, can be derived from the tax return data by adding  non-deductible 
expenses and deducting certain exemptions and allowable deductions (for more details, see 
Appendix A2). In contrast to a corporation’s “Total Revenue”, AGI also includes the revenue 
generated by  its fiscal subsidiaries. It differs from “ Taxable Income” (TI) by the amount of 
used tax loss carry-back and carry-forward and by the amount of allowable deductions for 
certain corporations. Corporations with a negative AGI in a particular year are excluded from 
the following analysis. The reason for excluding these cases is that the tax return data provide 
no information on the determinants of current losses which could be used to predict future 
losses. As discussed below, we try to control for potential selection effects resulting from the 
exclusion of these cases in the regression analysis.  
Our measure of the effective tax rate, ETR, is calculated for each corporation as the ratio 
of the corporate income tax assessed to its AGI in a given year. In case the AGI equals zero, 
the ETR is also set equal to zero. The ETR differs from the statutory rate in that tax credits for 
foreign-source income are deducted in the calculation of the corporate income tax assessed 
and by the difference between AGI and TI, which is mainly driven by the corporation’s loss 
carry-forward.  
AGI and ETR are calculated at the individual level for 1998 and 2001 and then aggregated 
to the group level of the pseudo-panel structure described in the previous sub-section, where 
the aggregation takes into account differences in group size. Table 1 presents means and 
standard deviations of AGI and ETR measured at the group level for 1998 and 2001 as well as 
the absolute and relative changes between the two years. 
The upper part of the table shows that TI declined by about 113,000 Euros in the period 
1998-2001.  Average positive AGI for all corporations declined by 56,000 Euros (almost 
20 %) between 1998 and 2001, on average, from about 320,000 to 265,000 Euros.
6 Since AGI 
is negative for a large share of all corporations in both years, we report statistics for these 
variables for all corporations and for those with non-negative AGI.
7 For corporations with 
non-negative AGI, its average level amounted to almost 500,000 Euros in 1998 which 
dropped by about 102,000 Euros (also about 20 %) in this period, while the share of 
                                                 
6  In both cross sections there are some groups with one corporation being much larger in terms of AGI than the 
second biggest corporation in this group. We exclude corporations whose AGI exceed the second largest AGI 
by more than the factor 100 (1998: 11, 2001: 10 corporations) to avoid serious group dominance by a single 
corporation. 
7  When calculating the average ETR we assumed a rate of zero for corporations with negative AGI. In order to 
avoid problems with outliers we dropped corporations with an exceptionally large or small effective tax rate, 
i.e. with an effective tax rate exceeding 100 % (or -100 %).     10 
corporations reporting a positive AGI increased slightly. The marked decline in the average 
AGI in the observation period occurred although economic activity as measured by average 
sales in nominal terms increased by roughly 18,000 euros (see Appendix A3).  
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics  
  1998  2001  D  %D 
Taxable Income in 1,000 € (average) 






(1,653.27)  -219.51 






(1,433.54)  -22.05 
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) in 1,000 € (average) 














(2,354.43)  -23.43 







Effective Tax Rate (average) 






(0.025)  -43.86 








Potential tax loss carry-forward in 1,000 €  (average) 






(2,201.18)  3.74 
 
corporations with tax loss carry-forward at 




(6,953.57)  -  - 
Number of groups   1,137  1,137  -  - 
Number of groups which exclusively contain 
corporations with non-negative AGI   1,074  1,074  -  - 







Number of corporations  
  all corporations  701,971  809,641  107,670  14.27 
  corporations with non-negative AGI  436,439  519,856  83,417  17.49 
 
corporations with positive AGI and without 
tax loss carry-forward  243,364  280,155  36,791  14.08 
 
corporations with tax loss carry-forward at 
the beginning of the year  354,471  404,524  50,053  13.21 
Notes:  All information is given on the aggregate level.  Standard deviations of variables are  given  in 
parentheses. %D is calculated as difference between logs, i.e. %DAGI=log(AGI2001)-log(AGI1998). 
Source:  Own calculations based on German Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, 
corporate income tax statistics 1998 and 2001.  
 
At the same time, the ETR was reduced by 4.25 percentage points on average, compared 
to a drop of the statutory tax rate of 20 percentage points (from 45 % in 1998 to 25 % in 
2001) for most corporations. There are various factors that have contributed to this difference: 
First, the reduction of the tax rate was partly compensated for by the simultaneous broadening 
of the tax base. Second, the reduction in the statutory tax  rate was lower for those     11 
corporations that benefited from a reduced tax rate in 1998. Third, corporations for whom the 
fiscal year differs from the calendar year are subject to a higher tax rate of 40 % in 2001. 
Fourth, for all corporations reporting a loss in both years the effective tax rate remained zero 
and did not change at all. And last but not least, AGI is lowered substantially by a large share 
of corporations (60 %) reporting a loss, a profit of zero or offsetting the whole of their profits 
against losses from other periods.
 8 Table 1 shows that the potential loss carry-forward, which 
can be carried forward infinitely and be offset against future profits; on average amounted to 
about 675 (700) thousand Euros in 1998 (2001), thereby substantially exceeding the average 
AGI of corporations recording positive AGI in these years.  
Compared to other measures of ETR  in our observation period reported in the literature 
for Germany (see, e.g., Devereux et al. 2003; Nicodème 2001, 2002; Gorter and de Mooij, 
2001; Buijink, Janssen and Schols 1999), our estimated rates seem surprisingly low.
9 
Comparability across studies is limited, however,  because our measure  is based on  the 
actually assessed tax and AGI, while the effective tax rate in these studies is calculated as the 
tax burden related to the profit in the commercial balance sheet or in the consolidated balance 
sheet. Importantly, in contrast to these studies, we take into account that profits can be offset 
against losses from other periods lowering the average effective tax rate in a given year. Our 
data set contains many firms (around 40 % of all firms) reporting a loss or a profit of zero 
which significantly reduces average effective tax rates.  
 
3.2 Identification and estimation 
We argue that the tax base elasticity can be identified by taking advantage of the pseudo-
panel structure of our corporate tax return data  and changes to the corporate tax system 
introduced by the Tax Relief Act  in the period 1998-2001. F ollowing the methodology 
proposed by Gruber and Saez (2002) and Gruber and Rauh (2007), our identification strategy 
consists of instrumenting a corporation’s ETR for 2001 by the simulated ETR the corporation 
would face in 2001 if its real tax base had not changed endogenously between 1998 and 2001. 
Thereby, we only use changes in the tax law and macroeconomic effects exogenous to the 
                                                 
8  These factors are related to the major CIT reform introduced in this period which will be exploited for the 
identification of the tax base elasticity as described in Section 3.2. 
9  These estimates also differ from those based on aggregate revenue data published by the OECD and the 
European Commission which are based not on assessed but pre-paid corporate taxes. For Germany, pre-paid 
taxes are only weakly correlated with assessed taxes in any given year. For example, in 2001 pre-paid 
corporate taxes were virtually zero whereas assessed corporate taxes amounted to about 20 billion Euros. 
Furthermore, the profit measure used for the calculation of average corporate tax rates also differs from 
corporate taxable income or  AGI. For example, the European Commission (2003) uses the net operating 
surplus of the business sector which also includes unincorporated enterprises.     12 
individual corporation to identify the elasticity of the tax base with respect to the effective tax 
rate.  
The  Tax Relief Law  (Steuerentlastungsgesetz) significantly reduced the statutory 
corporate income tax rate: In 1998, the corporate income tax in principle amounted to 45 % 
for retained earnings and to 30 % for distributed earnings while the tax rate was generally 
reduced to 25 % in 2001.
10 It changed the taxation of dividends from the tax credit method 
(“imputation method”) to the half-income method and thereby also affected personal income 
taxation.
11 The reform also broadened the tax base by lowering depreciation allowances, by 
introducing the requirement to reinstate original values, and by cutting the use of a tax loss 
carry-back. As the tax reform did not affect corporations equally, we observe substantial 
variation in the change of their effective tax rates, due to the following factors: 
First, every year a share of 20 % of German corporations use a tax loss carry-forward or a 
tax loss carry-backward to offset current profits. These corporations do not pay any corporate 
income tax and thus have an effective tax rate of zero which remains unaffected by changes in 
the statutory tax rate. Note that the use of tax loss carry-forward is not at the corporation’s 
discretion because unused tax loss carry-forward has to be set off in the full amount against 
current profits.  
Second, the statutory and effective tax rate in 1998 was dependent on the ratio between 
retained and distributed earnings: A corporation which completely abstained from the 
distribution of earnings was liable for a corporate income tax rate of 45 %; whereas a 
corporation which distributed its whole profit was subjected to a corporate income tax rate of 
30 % only. The splitting of the tax rate is a specific feature of the tax credit method.
12 It was 
abolished by the Tax Relief Law; since 2001, the tax rate on corporate income is uniform and 
does not depend on a corporation’s payout ratio.
13 This implies that the reduction in the 
                                                 
10 Corporations are also liable to the local business tax (Gewerbesteuer). This tax is levied on an adjusted profit 
measure (including a share of interest payments on long-term debt and leasing costs) at a rate which varies 
across municipalities (for details, see Bach et al. 2008, Fossen and Bach 2008). In general, the local business 
tax paid by a corporation is a deductible expense. Since there was no change in the local business tax between 
1998 and 2001 and the municipality specific rates hardly changed in this period (German Federal Statistical 
Office 1998, 2001), we have not taken it into account in our ETR simulation.  
11 Unfortunately, we do not have any information about a corporation’s shareholders. We neither know their 
participation quota nor do we have any knowledge about other sources of income or about their personal 
income tax. As personal income taxation in Germany is highly progressive and as taxation partly depends on 
the participation quota this lack of information prevents us from including personal income taxation into our 
analysis. To simplify the analysis we do not include the solidarity surcharge which amounts to 5.5 % in 1998 
and 2001. As the solidarity surcharge is a proportional surcharge on the corporate income tax assessed, 
omitting the surcharge should not influence our results.  
12 Under the tax-credit method the tax burden on the corporate level is only meant as a mean to ensure taxation 
of capital income and is credited against the personal income tax of the shareholder. 
13 Under the half income method the corporate income tax is definite. Half of the dividends are additionally 
subjected to personal income tax.     13 
effective tax rate was much larger for those corporations which retained most of their earnings 
than for the corporations distributing their whole profit. 
Third, some corporations were subject to reduced statutory corporate income tax rates in 
1998. Mutual insurance societies, private foundations, and business enterprises of a public 
corporation benefited from a reduced tax rate of 42 % in 1998. At the same time a flat tax of 
25 % applied to different sources of foreign income. The Tax Relief Law, by contrast, does 
not provide any reductions in statutory tax rates but equally applies the tax rate of 25 % to 
every corporation. As a result, the reduction in the statutory and in the effective tax rate 
between 1998 and 2001 was smaller for all those corporations which benefited from reduced 
taxation in the past. Some corporations even saw their tax rate rising: Operators of merchant 
ships in the international bodies of water were liable for a reduced rate of 22.5 % in 1998; in 
2001, the universal tax rate of 25 % applied. 
Fourth, the change in the effective tax rate also depends on the asset structure. This 
means, for instance, that corporations that placed large real investments in both years saw 
their tax base broadened in 2001 because of lower depreciation allowances for new acquired 
goods compared to 1998.  
And fifth, corporations with a fiscal year differing from the calendar year only switched to 
the half income method and the lower tax rate in 2002. In 2001, they were still taxed under 
the tax credit method and had to pay a tax rate of 40 %. This means that the reduction in the 
effective tax rate for these particular corporations was much smaller than for the ones taxed 
according to the half income method in 2001.
14  
Simulated tax liabilities and effective tax rates are computed using the business taxation 
microsimulation model BizTax.
15 First, AGI and all income related components of the 1998 
cross section are aged to 2001 values using a nominal growth rate which is exogenous to the 
individual corporation.  There are 13 different inflation parameters  for different sources of 
income (profits and losses, dividends and income from interest, differentiated by financial and 
non-financial corporations).
16  Using BizTax  we then simulate the corporate  tax liability 
                                                 
14 Blasch and Weichenrieder (2007) present the transitional rules and analyse whether listed corporations align 
their fiscal year to the calendar year due to this rule. 
15 BizTax is a microsimulation model for business taxation in Germany based on official tax return data 
developed at DIW Berlin in cooperation with the Federal Ministry of Finance. In addition to a detailed local 
business tax module, i t also contains a CIT simulation module which replicates the corporate income tax 
assessed by tax authorities for more than 99 % of all corporations; these corporations account for more than 99 
% of the overall corporate income tax revenue. BizTax can be used to simulate the corporate income tax 
liability of each corporation under past regulations, under the current law as well as under different tax reform 
scenarios. Currently the model does not predict behavioral responses of companies which may be triggered by 
tax reforms, e.g. changes in financing and investment decisions or entries and exits of firms. 
16 These parameters were computed in such a way that inflated profits and interests reflect the changes in the 
corresponding aggregates in the national accounts and the Bundesbank corporate balance sheet statistics.     14 
according to the corporate income tax law 2001 based on the inflated income components. 
The simulated ETR for 2001 is obtained by relating the simulated tax liability for 2001 to the 
inflated AGI for 1998.  
One might be concerned that this simulated ETR  is not completely exogenous for those 
corporations which offset part (or the whole) of their profits in 1998 against losses from the 
past or from 1999 (loss carry-back) because the amount of profits that can be offset against 
losses from other periods is a function of the tax rules. The Tax Relief Law broadened the tax 
base and consequently increased AGI. This had two implications: first, a rise in the effective 
tax rate, and second the need of a larger volume of losses from other periods to offset a higher 
AGI.  The ability to offset a higher  AGI resulting from the tax reform could be related to 
unobserved factors which may also influence the tax base itself. To address this potential 
endogeneity, we inflate the amount of profits which is offset against losses from other periods 
in 1998 and use this amount as an upper limit for the profits that can be offset against losses 
in our simulation of a corporation’s ETR for 2001.
17 In a similar vein, we use the inflated 
amount of allowable deductions that are effectively used  in 1998  when we  simulate the 
corporation’s ETR for 2001. 
In the estimation we also control for other factors which  might be correlated with both 
AGI and ETR. First, we estimate the regression of log(AGI) on log(ETR) in first differences 
allowing for group-fixed effects which may be correlated with ETR. Second, we control for 
time-varying factors by including the number of corporations within a group, the share of 
corporations still taxed under the tax credit method in 2001, and average sales within a group. 
These variables may also control for changes within groups in the observation period which 
could affect the efficiency of our estimates, in particular the standard error of the estimated 
tax base elasticity. Information on sales originates from the value added tax (VAT) statistics 
of the German Federal Statistical Office. It is available at the same level of aggregation as the 
one used for the construction of our pseudo-panel data. For a f ew industries, which are not 
liable to the VAT, information on sales is missing. In some industries only part of their sales 
is liable to the VAT, which we try to control for by including an interaction term between this 
variable and the group’s sales. While we saw the AGI declining between 1998 and 2001, sales 
increased significantly in the same period. In 1998, corporations sold goods in the value of 
about 130 million Euros, on average, in 2001 sales amounted to almost 150 million Euros. 
Descriptive statistics of the other control variables are contained in the upper part of the table 
Appendix A3. 
                                                 
17 Since our microsimulation tax model does not include a switching rule between loss and profit, a corporation 
reporting a profit in 1998 is assumed also to do so in 2001.     15 
As described in Section 3.1.2, 40 % of all corporations report a negative AGI, and this 
share slightly decreased between 1998 and 2001. Our tax return data unfortunately do not 
contain information  which would allow us to model these losses. We therefore restrict our 
regression analysis to corporations with positive AGI and try, in an alternative model 
specification, to control potential selection effects by including the change in the share of 
corporations with positive profits within groups in the observation period.  
Using the pseudo panel described in the previous section and taking first differences of 
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where a is a constant, b is the corporate tax base elasticity we want to estimate, g is a 
column vector of regression coefficients, Dxg is a column vector composed of first differences 
of the control variables in group g introduced above, and ug = ug,2001 - ug,1998 is a first-
differenced error term for each group, which may or may not be serially correlated but, 
conditionally on Dxg, is assumed to be uncorrelated with the change in the ETR. 
Below we will report simple OLS and 2SLS regression results where the ETR for 2001 in 
the relative change in ETR will be instrumented by the simulated ETR for 2001 as described 
above. In this regression, the b coefficient measures the elasticity of the corporate tax base 
with respect to the effective tax rate: a value of zero implies that the tax base does not react to 
changes in the effective tax rate at all; a coefficient of  -1 indicates that a decrease in the 
effective tax rate of one percent increases the tax base by one percent. We will also estimate 
separate elasticities by characteristics that may be related to the ability of income shifting, 
such as economic sector, the average size of  corporations within sectors or the intensity of 
foreign direct investment.  
 
4  Estimation Results 
4.1 Basic regression results 
Table 2 reports OLS and 2SLS regression results for the regression model given by eq. (2) 
in the previous section.
18 To account for heteroskedasticity due to differences related to group 
                                                 
18 Since AGI is zero even at the group level in a few cases, which we couldn’t have used in the estimation of the 
specification given above, we have approximated log(AGIg,2001/AGIg,1998) and log(ETRg,2001/ETRg,1998) by, 
respectively, [(AGIg,2001-AGIg,1998)/.5(AGIg,2001+AGIg,1998)] and [(ETRg,2001-ETRg,1998)/.5(ETRg,2001+ETRg,1998)]. 
A sensitivity check shows, however, restricting the sample to groups with positive AGI and estimating the log-
log specification given above does not significantly change estimation results.     16 
size and possibly also serial correlation of error terms we report robust standard errors of 
estimated coefficients in all regressions.   
Table 2:  Basic regression results  
Dependent variable: log(AGIg,2001/AGIg,1998) 
    OLS    2SLS 
    (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 












share of corporations under the tax 
credit method 
  -  0.430 
(0.426) 






change in the number of corporations 
in the group 
  -  -0.002 
(0.100) 






dummy indicating groups which 













change in sales    -  0.180 
(0.097) 
  -  0.185 
(0.100) 
-  0.174 
(0.103) 
interaction term between changes in 
sales and the dummy indicating 
industries whose sales are not fully 




(0.105)    - 
0.137 
(0.121)  - 
0.146 
(0.124) 
change in the share of firms reporting 
positive AGI 
  -  -    -  -  -  1.440 
(0.453) 













2    0.005  0.064    -  -  -  - 
Number of observations    1,074  1,065    1,074  1,065  1,074  1,065 
Note:  Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust (Huber-White) standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Sources:  Own calculations based on German Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, 
corporate income tax statistics 1998 and 2001, value added tax statistics 1998 and 2001. 
 
As shown in column (1), the simple correlation of changes in the corporate tax base, 
measured by positive AGI, and the ETR between 1998 and 2001 is positive and significant. 
This simply reproduces the correlation structure already observed in our data (see Table 1), 
where we observed both the AGI and the ETR decline in this period. The correlation remains 
positive but becomes insignificant if the control variables introduced in the previous section 
are added.  
For the reasons mentioned in the previous section, we would not expect OLS regressions 
of the change in AGI on the change of the ETR to identify the tax base elasticity. In fact, 
standard Hausman-Wu endogeneity tests strongly indicate that ETR is an endogenous 
variable and OLS estimates of the tax elasticity are inconsistent. In particular, inclusion of the 
residual from a first-stage regression of log(ETRg,2001/EGRg,1998) on the control variables Dxg 
in the structural equation yields a t-value of 18.3; alternatively, a standard Hausman test turns 
out significant at the 1 %-level (p-value = 0.0106).      17 
Before we comment on the 2SLS estimation results reported in Table 2, we report the 
results of the first-stage regression with the simulated ETR as our instrument for the ETR 
actually observed in 2001. As shown in Appendix A4, the simple correlation between the 
relative change in the ETR actually observed and the one obtained by instrumenting 
ETR 2001 in this expression by the simulated ETR for 2001 is quite strong. In the first-stage 
regression including all control variables, the R
2  is almost 0.5 and the coefficient of our 
instrument has t-statistic of about 30. To explicitly test for the relevance of the instruments in 
our multivariate setting, we calculate the Partial R² regarding our instrument as suggested by 
Shea (1997) and Godfrey (1999), which yields a Partial R² of about 0.42. This clearly shows 
that our instrument is indeed highly correlated with the change in the actually observed ETR 
and that our 2SLS estimation is not likely to suffer from the  ubiquitous weak instrument 
problem (see, e.g., Stock et al. 2002).  
As a benchmark, column (3) reports 2SLS estimation results without further control 
variables. The estimated tax base elasticity now becomes negative, with a point estimate of 
-.31, which is statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level (two-sided test, t-value of 
-1.75).  Adding the control variables to this regression  leaves the point estimate of the 
estimated tax base elasticity  in column (4) virtually unchanged but somewhat reduces its 
estimated standard error; the elasticity becomes significant at the 5 level (t-value=-1.96).
19  
The only control variable which seems to be significant in the regression  is the relative 
change of sales: a 10 % increase in sales raises the tax base by about 2 %.  As the sales 
variable is derived from the VAT statistics, which only includes sales liable to VAT, it only 
represents part of sales for a few groups in our pseudo-panel. To account for this, we include 
an interaction term of the sales variable with a dummy variable for groups whose sales are not 
fully liable to VAT in the regression. More importantly, exports are not liable to VAT in 
Germany and are thus not included in our sales variable. Since the VAT statistic is the only 
data source available at a level of aggregation required to match sales data to our pseudo 
panel, we cannot adjust the sales data for export shares. As far as export shares have not 
changed in the observation period, this measurement error should be accounted for by the 
group-fixed effects or, in other words, purged from the first-differenced regression. This also 
holds for shocks to the corporate tax base which may also affect the volume of sales as long 
as this relation has not changed in the observation period.  
                                                 
19 As a sensitivity check we also included the square of the tax variable to pick up nonlinear effects of tax 
changes on changes of the corporate tax base. Estimated coefficients of the linear and quadratic term of the tax 
variable remained jointly statistically significant at the 10 % level and estimated elasticities, evaluated at 
sample means, were virtually identical in the two specifications.      18 
Since both of these assumptions  might be questioned, we have also estimated the 
regression without the potentially endogenous sales variable (and the interaction term). As 
shown  by column (5), this  has almost no effect on  the  estimated tax base elasticity. This 
indicates that a change in the ETR has little effect on sales and affects the corporate tax base 
via income shifting responses rather than real responses as far as these are related to changes 
in the volume of sales.
20  
Another potential bias may result from a selection effect since we only include 
corporations with non-negative AGI in the estimation. If this selection is determined by fixed 
group effects only, our first-difference estimation should control for it. However, it cannot be 
ruled out that the factors affecting this selection have been changing in the observation period. 
Since we do not observe factors which might be correlated with time-varying selection we 
cannot control for this by a formal selectivity correction, i.e. by the standard Heckman 
selection procedure. We can, however, approximate the selection term by the average 
probability of non-negative AGI in a particular group, i.e. by the share of corporations that 
report a non-negative AGI in a given year. Thus, in the regression reported in column (6) we 
report estimation results with the change of the share of corporations with positive AGI within 
groups included as additional control variable. Estimation results show that this variable is 
highly significant and has a relatively strong effect on the elasticity estimate; it increases in 
absolute value to -.533, with a t-value of -2.7.  
Thus, although somewhat sensitive to the treatment of corporate losses, our 2SLS 
estimates do suggest a relatively strong elasticity of the tax base, as measured by AGI, to a 
corporation’s ETR. How does this tax base elasticity compare to the one obtained by Gruber 
and Rauh (2007), the study most closely related to the present one? Comparing our elasticity 
estimate to the one of -0.2 reported by Gruber and Rauh, one has to keep in mind that their 
estimate refers to the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the marginal CIT rate. This 
rate is (slightly) progressive in the US, whereas the statutory corporate tax is constant in 
Germany. Thus to make the two estimates roughly comparable, we have to calculate hTI,t ” 
(DTI/Dt)·(t/TI), which we get by multiplying our elasticity estimate, hAGI,ETR , by the product 
of the elasticity of TI with respect to AGI (hTI,AGI) and the elasticity of the ETR with respect 
to the statutory corporate tax rate (hETR,t,). 
As discussed in Section 2, only in the unlikely case that deductions and allowances are 
proportional to AGI, and in the absence of loss carry-forward and loss carry-backward, is 
there a simple relationship between changes in the statutory corporate tax rate, the tax base 
                                                 
20 A bivariate IV regression of the relative change in sales on the relative change of the ETR with the same IV as 
in the tax base regression yielded a coefficient estimate of -.029 with a t-value of 0.21.      19 
elasticity and the change in tax revenues. In this case hTI,AGI =hETR,t =1, and our estimate of 
hAGI,ETR = -0.53 would imply that a reduction of the statutory tax rate by 10 % would results in 
an increase of TI by about 5 %. However, since deductions are not proportional to AGI, and 
because of the importance of loss carry-forward, to exactly calculate hTI,AGI estimates of hETR,t 
and hTI,AGI are required. Using our corporate tax microsimulation model BizTax we find hETR,t 
= 0.855 and hTI,AGI = 1.062.
21 Using these estimates and our preferred estimate for hAGI,ETR, 
we find that a 10 % reduction of the statutory tax rate increases TI by 4.8 %, which is only 
slightly smaller t han the estimate obtained under the assumption of proportionality  of 
deductions and AGI.  
Thus, we may conclude that, at least for our application, hAGI,ETR @ hTI,t which implies that 
our estimate of the tax base elasticity is more than double the size of the estimate obtained by 
Gruber and Rauh in their study for the US. There are at least two reasons for this difference, 
apart from the obvious one that these estimates refer to two different countries:  First, the 
study by Gruber and Rauh is based on accounting data and only covers part of the corporate 
sector. Second, their effective tax rate measure mainly affects marginally profitable 
investments and does not account for various tax shields, especially tax loss carry-forward.  
Our estimate of the tax base elasticity can also be used to answer the question of how 
changes in the statutory tax rate affect corporate tax revenues. This is of great importance for 
fiscal policy because the statutory corporate tax rate is a policy variable whereas the ETR 
cannot directly be manipulated for tax policy purposes. Taking our elasticity estimate of about 
-0.5, and assuming for simplicity that the proportionality assumption between deductions and 
AGI holds, we would expect a 10 % reduction of the statutory corporate tax rate to result in a 
reduction  of corporate tax  revenues by  5 %. This is only half of the loss in tax revenues 
resulting from a tax rate reduction by 10 % in the absence of any income shifting and real 
responses of corporations to the tax change. 
Thus, our estimate of the tax base elasticity implies that tax rate reductions are partly “self 
financing”, but does not support recent “Laffer curve” estimates for the corporate sector by 
Clausing (2007), Devereux (2007) and Brill and Hassett (2007). These  authors  report  a 
revenue-maximizing statutory CIT rate in the range between about 20 and 35 %.
22 Given 
                                                 
21 These simulations assume that any response of a tax rate change is already accounted for by our estimated tax 
base elasticity. 
22 These studies are based on simple OLS regressions of corporate tax revenues, normalized by GDP, on the 
statutory tax rate, its square and a couple of control variables estimated on a panel of pooled OECD time 
series-cross section data. Since these regressions do not include country fixed effects that might be correlated 
with both tax r evenues and the statutory tax rate it seems questionable whether these estimates can be 
interpreted as tax base elasticities, however. As reported by Clausing (2007) and Devereux  (2007), there is not     20 
these estimates and the decline of the statutory CIT rate from 45 % to 25 % between 1998 and 
2001, the German corporate sector should have been on the declining segment of the “Laffer 
curve”, and the reduction of the statutory rate should have increased corporate tax revenues. 
Of course, there was no corresponding increase  in corporate tax revenues in this period, 
although the revenue decline was much less severe than it would have been in the absence of 
any behavioral response, which is compatible with our preferred empirical tax base elasticity.  
Although  this average elasticity is n ot compatible with a “Laffer curve” effect for the 
whole corporate sector in Germany, certain sub-groups of corporations may well be much 
more responsive to tax rate changes. That is, this average tax base elasticity  may hide 
important differences  between corporations, and this  heterogeneity may provide crucial 
information for tax policy. In particular, as stressed by recent literature (see Section 2), the tax 
base elasticity may differ by the degree of international tax competition and income shifting 
opportunities.
23 To account for these factors, we now turn to some further estimation results 
which take into account potential heterogeneity in tax base elasticities to some extent. 
4.2 Heterogeneous tax base elasticities 
First, we look at differences in tax base elasticities in the manufacturing (“secondary 
sector”) compared to other sectors of the economy. In Germany, the manufacturing sector is 
still relatively large compared to other developed market economies  and has been under 
considerable pressure from international competition during our observation period. Income 
shifting in this sector may be expected to be more prevalent than in the service sector which is 
also much less exposed to international competition.  Furthermore,  certain regulations 
introduced by the Tax Relief Law, such as changes in the depreciation rules, might have had a 
stronger impact on the manufacturing sector. Second, we investigate whether estimated tax 
base elasticities differ by the average size of corporations within groups.  Third, we test 
whether differences in the capital structure of corporations affect the tax base elasticity, 
because deductible interest payments may act as a tax shield. And finally, we test whether the 
tax base elasticity differs by the intensity of international tax competition as measured by the 
FDI intensity within groups.  
                                                                                                                                                         
enough within-country variation in statutory tax rates to identify the tax base elasticity conditional on country 
fixed effects.  
23 In his study on the elasticity of taxable personal income with respect to the personal marginal income tax 
Kopczuk (2005) shows that the size of this elasticity importantly depends on the degree to which induced 
changes in the tax base vary across tax payers.      21 
Table 3:  Tax base elasticities by subgroups – 2SLS estimation 
Dependent variable: log(AGIg,2001/AGIg,1998) 
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primary sector / services  -0.329 
(0.221) 
-  -  -  673 
manufacturing  -0.634 
(0.382) 
-  -  -  392 
sales            









£ median  -0.561 
(0.248 
-  -  -  532 
> median  -0.465 
(0.316) 
-  -  -  533 
wages            









£ median  -0.259 
(0.234) 
-  -  -  534 
> median  -0.615 
(0.305) 
-  -  -  531 
equity capital           









£ median  -0.288 
(0.211) 
-  -  -  535 
> median    -0.524 
(0.347) 
-  -  -  530 
debt/equity ratio           









£ median  -0.649 
(0.311) 
-  -  -  506 
> median    -0.260 
(0.284) 
-  -  -  504 
FDI/equity ratio           









£ median  -0.415 
(0.231) 
-  -  -  548 
> median  -0.696 
(0.358) 
-  -  -  517 
Notes:  All regressions include a constant and the same control variables as those reported in Table 2. Robust 
standard errors are given in parentheses below coefficient estimates. The F-test refers to the joint test 
of significance of the tax rate coefficient and the interaction between the tax rate and the respective 
variable. p-values for significance of the test are given in parentheses below the F-test statistic. 
Sources:  Own calculations based on German Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, 
corporate income tax statistics 1998 and 2001, value added tax statistics 1998 and 2001, local business 
tax statistics 1998, German Central Bank, micro database foreign direct investment 1998. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the estimation results for these alternative specifications of our basic 
regression model. All specifications start from the 2SLS model with the full set of control     22 
variables as given by column (6) in Table 2. Interaction terms are, of course, also 
instrumented by interacting the instrument with the respective variable used to measure 
heterogeneity in our sample. 
Estimation results accounting for sector differences are summarized in the first panel of 
Table 3. Since there are only very few groups in the primary sector (farming, forestry etc.), 
we aggregate these with the service sector
24 and interact the tax variable with a dummy for the 
secondary sector. Estimation results in column (1) indicate that the tax base in the secondary 
sector (manufacturing) is higher than in the primary and tertiary (service) sector. The point 
estimates imply a tax base elasticity of about -.6 (=-.38 + -.24) in manufacturing, compared to 
only -.38 in the primary and tertiary sector. However, this difference is statistically not well 
determined in our sample. Although the coefficient on the tax variable and the sector 
interaction term are jointly significant at the 10 % level (F-value = 2.88), the coefficient of the 
interaction term is not significant (t-value = -0.58).  
Splitting the sample and estimating our regression model separately for the two sectors, 
thus also allowing the coefficients of the control variables to differ between sectors, confirms 
that the relatively high average tax base elasticity is mainly related to the high elasticity in the 
secondary sector (see rows (2) and (3) in Table 3). For the secondary sector, the estimated tax 
base elasticity is statistically significantly different from zero at the 5 % level (two-sided test), 
whereas the much smaller (in absolute value) estimated tax base elasticity for the primary and 
tertiary sector is only marginally significant at the 10 % level. However, given the relatively 
large estimated standard errors, no statistically significant sector difference in estimated tax 
base elasticities between the two sectors can be detected. In other words, pooling the two 
sectors and estimating the tax base elasticity on the pooled sample is not rejected by the data. 
We would expect that this is mainly related to the strong remaining heterogeneity (high error 
variance) within sectors, but the sample size of our pseudo panel  puts tight limits on the 
possibility of further sector differentiation.  
Another source of heterogeneity relates to the average size of corporations within groups. 
It could be argued that large corporations might have better tax shifting opportunities than 
small firms, a nd also have better means at their disposal to take advantage of these 
opportunities. For example, there might be fixed costs of setting up affiliations used as tax 
shelters or, more generally, tax shifting costs per euro might decline with the volume of tax 
avoidance. We try to approximate such scale effects by various alternative measures: the 
average volume of sales, the wage sum, and the average equity capital. These variables are 
                                                 
24 Excluding corporations in the primary sector from the estimation sample as robustness check had very little 
effect on estimation results.     23 
measured at the start of our observation period in order to avoid the potential endogeneity of 
changes in the ETR and these variables in the observation period. Given the relatively small 
size of our pseudo panel, we simply differentiate between “small” and “large” corporation 
size defined by the median of these variables. 
Estimation results summarized  in  Table 3 show that, contrary to our expectation, there 
seems to be no statistically significant difference in the estimated tax base elasticity between 
groups differentiated by the average sales volume.  This is also confirmed by the 
insignificance of the coefficient on the interaction term between the tax variable and sales in 
the pooled regression (t-value=.73). Thus, pooling all observations and estimating the tax base 
elasticity on the pooled sample again is not rejected by the data. However, our sales variable 
may not be a very good indicator for the size of corporations in particular industries because, 
due to the data restrictions mentioned above, it does not include exports.  
The potential for profit shifting is perhaps better approximated by our second measure of 
size, the wage sum. Dividing the sample into groups with wage sum below and above the 
median we find that the point estimate for groups with relatively large corporations is larger 
compared to the one for groups with relatively small companies. Nevertheless, due to the 
large standard errors in both estimations we cannot reject the hypothesis that the elasticity is 
the same for both groups.  
A similar result is found when we use our third measure of size, the average equity capital 
within groups, where we split the sample into groups whose “average” corporation has equity 
below the median and groups with corporate equity higher than the median.
25 The third panel 
of Table 3  indeed  shows  that the point estimate of the tax base elasticity  for  larger 
corporations exceeds the point estimate for those groups with relatively small corporations, 
but this difference again is not statistically significant. Given the large standard errors of the 
tax base elasticity in the estimation based on the sample split,  we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of no population difference in tax base elasticities between the two groups. 
A better indicator for tax-shifting possibilities than the volume of equity capital per se 
might be a corporation’s capital structure which we measure, at the group level,  by  the 
amount of  interest paid by a corporation on its long-term debt relative to it equity capital.
26 
                                                 
25 In the dataset the amount of equity capital is recorded at the individual corporate level as the sum of retained 
earnings and contributions to capital as far as they occurred after the company was founded. We approximate 
the average corporate capital stock within a group by adding the legal minimum deposit which amounts to 
25,000 euros for private limited liability companies and to 50,000 euros for public companies. 
26 Information on interest on long-term debt is not available in the corporate income tax statistics but can be 
derived from the local business tax statistics which covers the same population of corporations and is available 
for the same years as the corporate tax statistics. Since the two statistics cannot be matched on the micro level 
we have imputed information on interest payments from  the local business tax statistics using the same 
aggregation scheme as the one for our pseudo-panel data (see Section 3.1.1). Access to the micro data of the     24 
Given that the interest should be proportional to the level of corporate long-term debt, we 
refer to this variable as the debt/equity ratio. To avoid the potential endogeneity of changes in 
the ETR and capital structure, the debt/equity ratio is measured at the start of our observation 
period in 1998. Since interest on  a corporation’s debt  may act as a tax shield, we would 
expect the tax base of corporations with a relatively high debt/equity ratio to respond less to 
tax changes than  does the tax base of  corporations that can  take  less  advantage of this 
particular tax shield. Estimation results in Table 3 indeed seem to support this hypothesis: The 
point estimate of the tax base elasticity of -.65 for the groups with a relatively low debt/equity 
ratio is much larger than the estimated elasticity for the comparison group, which is not 
statistically different from zero. However, given the large standard errors of these estimates, 
we also cannot reject the hypothesis that estimated tax base elasticities do not differ between 
the two groups, as indicated by the insignificant coefficient of the interaction term in the 
pooled regression. 
Another  relevant  differentiation  of groups  suggested by the recent literature on 
international tax competition and foreign direct investment is to distinguish by the FDI 
intensity within groups. Extending hypotheses from this literature (see, e.g., Hines 1999, 
Bartelsmann and Beetsma 2003) we would expect corporations which undertook relatively 
large FDI in the past to have better future opportunities to reduce their tax liabilities at home 
by way of transfer pricing, creative financing, and other tax shields provided by their affiliates 
abroad. Thus, future changes in tax rates might have stronger effects, ceteris paribus, on 
corporations with a relatively large FDI stock.  
To test  this hypothesis, we obtained FDI i nformation  at the group level from the 
Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, the German Central 
Bank. This statistic includes corporations with minimum levels of FDI relative to total shares 
(see Lipponer 2003). Information is available at a slightly more aggregate level as implied by 
our grouping.
27 On the basis of this information we have calculated, at the group level, the 
ratio of FDI to equity capital  in 1998 and defined two sub-samples, one with a FDI ratio 
below or equal to the median and one with a FDI ratio above the median. Again, we use the 
stock of FID at the start of our observation period to avoid the potential endogeneity between 
tax changes and FDI in the observation period. 
                                                                                                                                                         
local business tax statistics is also possible  through the research centres of the Statistical Offices 
(www.forschungsdatenzentren.de).  Equity capital may become negative due to  differences in  tax and 
commercial balance sheet valuation and the transition rules from the tax credit to the half income method. As a 
sensitivity check, we also included these rare cases in the estimation sample which had almost no effect on the 
tax base elasticity in the sub-group with a relatively low debt/equity ratio. 
27 The MiDi data do not allow aggregation by federal states or industries at the 4- and 5-digit level. To merge the 
MiDi data to our pseudo-panel in these cases, we had to impute the same FDI/equity share from the MiDi data 
at the 3-digit industry level for Germany overall to the 4- and 5-digit level specified for our pseudo-panel data.     25 
Estimation results for these two sub-samples, summarized in the lower panel of Table 3, 
are compatible with the hypothesis that corporations more exposed to international 
competition, as measured by a relatively high share of FDI, respond more strongly to changes 
in the ETR than groups with a lower level of FID. For industries in the upper part of the FDI 
distribution, the point estimate implies a tax base elasticity of about -.7, compared to about 
-.42 for those groups with a FDI share below the median. Regarding the point estimates, the 
relatively large tax-base elasticity seems compatible with the observed sector differences, 
given that a relatively large share of manufacturing industries have FDI ratios exceeding the 
population median. However, as before, this difference is statistically not well determined in 
our sample. Although the coefficient on the tax variable and the FDI  interaction term are 
jointly significant at the 5 % level (F-value = 3.84) in the pooled regression, the coefficient of 
the interaction term is not  statistically  significant different from zero.  Neither can the 
hypothesis be rejected that the average tax base elasticity in the sector with a high FID ratio is 
-1, and in the sector with a low ratio is zero; our elasticity estimates differentiated by sub-
groups are not precise enough to distinguish between these alternative hypotheses. However, 
the average tax base elasticity across all groups would still be about -0.5.  
Overall, although we do find  some  suggestive evidence for differences in tax base 
elasticities with respect to variables which are related to income shifting activities discussed 
in the recent literature,  such as sector, a corporation’s size, its capital structure and FDI 
intensity,  these differences are not statistically significant. This is probably due to the 
limitations of our relatively small pseudo panel data set to further split up the sample in 
smaller subgroups in combination with the well-known property of the IV estimator to yield 
fairly large standard errors of estimated coefficients in small and medium-sized samples. 
Thus, based on our preferred specification we would conclude that the average corporate tax 
base elasticity is about -.5, and there is relatively little variation across industries by sector, 
size, capital structure, and the FDI intensity. 
 
5  Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the small empirical  literature on the elasticity of the corporate 
tax base with respect to the effective corporate tax rate. Knowing the size of this elasticity is 
important to evaluate both the revenue and welfare implications of corporate tax policy. An 
important advantage of the tax return data used in this study is that they allow us to calculate 
effective corporate tax rates and the corporate income tax base taking into account various tax 
shields, in particular loss carry-forward which has become of major quantitative importance 
for the corporate sector also in the German economy. For the estimation we use a pseudo-    26 
panel constructed from aggregating the individual-level corporate tax return data into about 
1,000 groups defined by industry (up to the 5-digit level) and by region. This pseudo panel 
also allows us to control for unobserved group-fixed effects which may be correlated with 
both the corporate tax base, which we measure by Adjusted Gross Income, and the effective 
tax rate.  
The main methodological problem in the estimation of this elasticity is that the ETR may 
be endogenous as it is partly determined by taxable income. To control for this endogeneity 
we have applied an instrumental variable approach. As our instrument for the observed ETR 
we have used the counterfactual ETR a corporation would face in a particular period had there 
be no change of profits within the corporation’s control within that period. This counterfactual 
is obtained from a microsimulation model of the corporate sector based on tax return data for 
1998 and 2001. This period saw the introduction of a substantial tax reform, which provides 
sufficient exogenous variation in effective tax rates across corporations to identify the 
corporate taxable income elasticity. Statistical tests strongly indicate that our instrument is 
indeed highly correlated with the change in the actually observed ETR and that the well-
known weak instrument problem does not invalidate our instrumental variable estimation. 
Our preferred 2SLS estimation  of the basic regression model estimated on the whole 
sample yields a statistically significant and relatively  large point estimate of the tax base 
elasticity of about -0.5. This estimate implies that a reduction of the (proportional) statutory 
corporate tax rate by 10 % would reduce corporate tax receipts by only 5  %.  Since the 
estimated tax base elasticity is not sensitive to the control of the growth rate of sales at the 
industry level, we  may  interpret the response of the tax base to changes in the ETR as 
resulting from income shifting activities rather than real economic response of the corporate 
sector as far as this is related to sales volume. This average elasticity is more than double the 
size of the one estimated for the US by Gruber and Rauh (2007), the study which is most 
closely related to the present one.  Thus, reductions of the statutory corporate tax rate are 
partly “self financing” by reducing corporate income shifting activities, but the corporate 
sector has not been on the declining segment of the “Laffer curve”, even before the substantial 
reduction of statutory corporate tax rates recently introduced in Germany.  
We do find some evidence that certain sub-groups of corporations may well be much 
more responsive to tax rate changes than indicated by our estimate of the average tax base 
elasticity for the whole corporate sector. The estimation results regarding heterogeneous tax 
base elasticities are consistent with the hypothesis that the tax base is more responsive for 
corporations that may benefit from income shifting. Our point estimates indicate that tax base 
elasticities may be above average in the manufacturing sector, in industries dominated by     27 
larger corporations, and by corporations with a relatively high share of FDI at the beginning 
of our observation period. The tax base of corporations with a relatively high debt/equity ratio 
responds less to  tax changes than does the tax base of corporations that can take less 
advantage of this particular tax shield. However, the statistical precision of these estimation 
results prevents us from drawing too strong conclusions for subgroups of our pseudo-panel. 
Improving statistical precision of t esting alternative  income-shifting  hypotheses  would 
probably require a true panel of corporate tax return data which is currently not available for 
most countries, including Germany. Another possibility could be to add additional years to 
the pseudo-panel structure and exploit changes in regulations affecting corporate tax shields. 
This would also provide the opportunity to test for the longer-term effects of tax changes.     28 
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A2:  Components of the corporate tax base and corporate income tax assessed 
Profit as shown in tax balance sheet 
+/-  correcting entry concerning valuation              
(adjustment of values of balance sheet items, non tax deductible losses and non tax 
relevant gains etc.) 
+  correction of activities that are related to shareholders (declared profit distributions and 
constructive dividends, repayment of capital or capital increase, hidden contribution and 
other deposits under company law) 
+   non-deductible operating expenses             
(especially taxes paid, 50 % of payment to members of the supervisory board, penalties) 
+/-  non tax relevant domestic increases and decreases in net worth (inter-company dividends, 
investment subsidies etc.) 
+/-  corrections related to double taxation agreements, tax legislation relating to non-
residents, and fiscal units 
=   Total Revenue 
-   allowable deductions for agriculture and forestry 
-   deductible donations and contributions 
+/-  income generated by fiscal subsidiaries 
=   Adjusted Gross Income 
-   loss carry-over and loss carry-back 
=   Net Income  
-  allowable deductions for non-incorporated firms and for commercial cooperatives 
=   Taxable Income  
*   statutory tax rate 
-  tax credits for foreign-source income 
=   Corporate income tax assessed     31 
A3:  Descriptive statistics for control variables – aggregate level 
  1998  2001  D  D % 
















Share of groups which exclusively contain 















Share of groups whose sales are not fully 















(119,485.84)  9.60 




















0.000  0.00 
sales in 1,000 € (average in 1998)         
low share (= 50 %) 
9,211.25 
(8,322.21)  -  -  - 
wages in 1,000 € (average in 1998)         
all groups 
1,152.06 
(6,902.44)  -  -  - 
low share (= 50 %) 
21.28 
(6.84)  -  -  - 
equity capital in 1,000 € (average in 1998)         
all groups 
2,368.45 
(18,201.99)  -  -  - 
low share (= 50 %) 
32.45 
(248.46) 
-  -  - 
debt/ equity ratio (average in 1998)         
all groups 
0.273 
(4.183)  -  -  - 
low share (= 50 %) 
0.038 
(0.026) 
-  -  - 
FDI / equity ratio (average in 1998)         
all groups 
0.009 
(0.145)  -  -  - 
low share (= 50 %) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-  -  - 
Notes:  Sales and foreign direct investment (FDI) are not available on the individual level. FDI is not 
available on the group level but on a more aggregate level only (no differentiation across federal states 
or on the 4 -  or 5 -digit industry level); on that aggregation level we have 45 observations.  A few 
groups with negative debt/equity ratios are excluded (see text).  Standard deviations are reported in 
parentheses. 
Sources:  Own calculations based on German Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, 
corporate income tax statistics 1998 and 2001, value added tax statistics 1998 and 2001, local business 
tax statistics 1998, German Central Bank, micro database foreign direct investment 1998.     32 
A4:  First stage of the 2SLS regression 
Dependent variable: log(ETRg,2001/ETRg,1998) 
  (1)  (2) 




share of corporations under the tax credit method  -  0.2837 
(0.0668) 
change in the number of corporations in the group  -  0.0407 
(0.0159) 
change in sales  -  0.0254 
(0.0137) 
interaction term between changes in sales and the dummy 





dummy indicating groups which exclusively contain firms 
located in Western Germany 
-  -0.0228 
(0.0088) 
change in the share of firms reporting a positive AGI  -  0.5235 
(0.0640) 





2  0.4437  0.4885 
Number of observations  1,074  1,065 
F-Statistic  855.08  144.21 
Partial R²   -  0.4181 
Notes:  Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Calculations of the Partial R² are described in Shea (1997) 
and Godfrey (1999). 
Sources:  Own calculations based on German Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Länder, 
corporate income tax statistics 1998 and 2001, value added tax statistics 1998 and 2001. 
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